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Abstract
China’s economy has entered a “new normal,” characterized by slower economic 
growth and widespread overcapacity in its industrial sectors. Nevertheless, construction 
of power plants, especially coal-fired plants, continues at a rapid pace. Our analysis 
examines the extent of overcapacity in China’s regional electricity grids. We show that 
already in 2014, the average reserve margin across China’s regional grids was roughly 
28%, almost twice as high as a standard planning reserve margin in the U.S. In 
addition, we find large variations in reserve margins across regional power grids in 
China, with the highest reserve margin (64%) in the Northeastern grid. This paper 
examines future reserve margins across regions in China under three growth scenarios.
The results suggest that the majority of China will not need new baseload coal power (at
least for reliability purposes) before 2020, and potentially not until 2025, under the low- 
and mid-growth scenarios. Under the high-growth scenario, China’s central and eastern 
regions will need to import more power or built new capacity by 2020. As China’s energy
sector enters this new normal, our results highlight the growing importance of 
establishing mechanisms — planning processes and markets — that coordinate 
generation and transmission investments across grid regions, and that align the 
country’s energy sector investments with its longer-term air quality and climate goals.
Keywords
Excess capacity; coal-fired power plants; regional; China
Highlights
 Analyzes current and future reserve margins in China’s regional grids under three
scenarios of electricity demand growth
 China has more than enough power plants to meet electricity demand today, and 
does not need any new base-load coal power plants for reliability purposes by 
2020, and potentially by 2025. 
 There are large discrepancies in reserve margins among grid regions, which 
suggest the importance of coordination among grid regions in providing for 
generation adequacy across China. 
 China needs a more integrated and robust planning process to meet its national 
environmental and reliability goals at the least social cost.
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1. Introduction
Transitioning away from coal is critical for China’s low-carbon growth, and for global 
efforts to reduce the risks of climate change. Reducing the share of coal in China’s 
generation mix is an important part of this transition, particularly as electricity accounts 
for a growing share of China’s final energy consumption. 
China’s rapid economic growth over the past two decades was driven by industry and 
exports and fueled by coal, leading to a sharp increase in global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. However, it is widely recognized that the Chinese economy has entered a 
so-called “new normal,” characterized by a lower overall economic growth rate, a 
structural shift toward a service economy, and widespread overcapacity in industrial 
sectors [1,2]. As a consequence, in 2015, China’s energy consumption grew only 1.0%, 
and electricity consumption growth slowed to 0.96% [3].
Despite this slowdown in electricity demand, power plant construction and permitting 
continued at a rapid pace. Government agencies reported that 130 gigawatts (GW) of 
new generation capacity was added in 2015 [4]; Yuan et al. (2016) estimates that an 
additional 200 GW of coal-fired generation capacity is under construction, with more in 
the permitting process [5].
Recently, many have posited that China’s power sector likely has an excess of 
generation capacity, particularly coal-fired generation capacity, relative to what is 
needed to reliably meet demand [5–8, 31-33]. Average annual operating hours for 
thermal generation units, a commonly used barometer of capacity utilization, dropped to
4,364 hours in 2015 (a 50% capacity factor), reaching its lowest level since 1969 [9]. 
Even though, in recent years, power overcapacity in China has been widely recognized 
as a major issue, few analyses have taken a systematic approach to assessing 
overcapacity. Within China, operating hours (or “utilization hours”) are often used as the 
principal indicator of overcapacity [5,10, 34]. However, operating hours are a measure 
of asset utilization, and do not necessarily provide information about reliability or 
economic efficiency. For instance, an electricity system with large amounts of 
hydropower, wind, or solar generation may have low operating hours for thermal 
generators, but will not have excess generation capacity.
Another, more accurate way of measuring overcapacity would be reliability 
metrics.Typically, reliability studies calculate the probability of power outages in the 
high-voltage transmission system, given demand characteristics and the probability of 
unexpected generator failures. This probability, referred to as a loss-of-load probability, 
requires detailed information on electricity demand (loads) and generator failure 
probabilities. This information is, however, not publicly available in China.
An alternative approach is to use reserve margins, which are defined as the percentage 
of available generating capacity during an annual peak demand period in excess of 
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peak demand. Many international studies have used reserve margins (or “security 
margins”) to evaluate power grid reliability and generating capacity needs [11–13]. This 
paper contributes to the current literature as the first analysis of reserve margins at the 
regional level in China.
In this study, we use regional grids as the unit of analysis for two reasons. First, publicly 
available, systematically reported data on peak electricity demand is only available for 
regional grids. Second, although electricity supply-demand balancing for planning 
purposes is typically done at the provincial level in China, for decades China’s electricity
system has been organized into six regional synchronous grids. Regional grid operators
play an important role in addressing supply and demand imbalances among provinces 
in China [14], and this role is likely to grow as regional and interregional transmission 
systems evolve [15–17] and China moves toward regional wholesale markets for 
electricity. 
International trends also suggest a movement to wider-balancing areas to reduce 
generation costs and absorb variable renewable generation. For example, the 
development of U.S. Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System 
Operators since Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order No. 2000 [18], 
demonstrates the benefits of coordinated regional planning and the use of electricity 
resources [19]. Similarly, understanding reserve margins at the regional grid level will be
important to developing a more systematic approach to power system planning in 
China.
This paper is timely as China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (FYP) for Electric Power 
Development (the Plan) was just issued in late 2016, after a 15-year absence [20], The 
Plan recognizes that surplus capacity is likely to stay and demand growth is significantly
slower than in the past. However, it also sets fairly aggressive targets for new 
generation capacity across various sources, including 200 GW of thermal coal plants. 
Given this newly released Plan, this paper not only assesses the current regional nature
of generation overcapacity in China, but also evaluates if the power capacity goals 
specified in the Plan will exacerbate the overcapacity issue in the near to medium term 
(2020 and 2025).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the Background section reviews current 
electricity planning and project approval processes in China as well as new policies to 
limit coal power plants; then the Methods and Results sections show how we apply our 
methodology to estimate China’s current and future reserve margins by regional grids 
for 2020 and 2025. The final section proposes future research areas and delineates 
policy implications.
2. Background
Many of the current overcapacity challenges facing China’s electricity sector have their 
roots in an antiquated planning and project approval process which has caused several 
boom-and-bust cycles in the last three decades. Before 2004, electricity investment 
projects were reviewed and approved by different government agencies based on 
investment size, with larger projects approved by the central government and smaller 
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3
projects approved by local governments. Declining electricity demand growth during the 
Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998) led to a slowdown in central government approvals, 
resulting in severe power shortages in 2003 and 2004 and a surge in construction of 
small-scale coal-fired power plants that were approved by local governments [21].
To address this rapid expansion, China’s State Council centralized approval authority for
most new generation and transmission projects in 2004 [22]. However, it did so without 
also initiating a national planning process for electricity during the 11th FYP (2006–
2010) and the 12th FYP (2011–2015). New projects were required to receive a green 
light from the National Energy Administration (NEA) before beginning the formal 
approval process, but there were no transparent, rigorous criteria with which to evaluate
new projects. This gap between planning and project approval led to a disconnect 
among electricity demand, generation and transmission investment, and policy goals.
In mid-2014, NEA simplified the approval process for coal-fired power generation and 
tried to link it to a national planning process, where NEA would determine an allowed 
amount of new coal generation capacity for each province each year over five to seven 
years, and each year provincial governments would decide which projects to approve. 
Local governments were required to submit the entire portfolio of projects to NEA for 
review and approval, using transparent criteria to evaluate different projects [23]. 
By early 2015, the approval process for new coal-fired generation had been largely 
decentralized to local governments. Decentralization of authority was accompanied by a
large increase in new coal generation projects. At the same time, however, electricity 
demand growth had begun to slow dramatically. 
In April 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and NEA 
issued three policies to limit the permitting and construction of new coal power plants 
and the retirement of inefficient power plants: (1) Announcement on Promoting Proper 
Development of Coal-fired Power Plants [24], (2) Announcement on Further Eliminating 
Inefficient Capacity for Coal-fired Power Plants [25], and (3) Announcement on 
Establishing a Risk Warning System for Coal-fired Power Plant Planning and 
Construction [26]. It is too early to tell whether these policies will reduce the number of 
coal plants to be built by 2020.
In addition to policies controlling coal power plants, NEA released a Management 
Guidelines for Electricity Planning in June 2016 [27], which was the first official guideline
for electricity planning published by the government since 2003. The document 
designated the NEA to develop national electricity plans, including regional electricity 
plans, and designated provincial energy departments to develop provincial electricity 
plans, which were required to be harmonized both between national and provincial 
electricity plans and between electricity export provinces and electricity import 
provinces. The electricity plan is meant to be a five-year plan, and it can allow 
adjustments to be made in two or three years after the plan is published. However, the 
document does not explicitly state whether or how project approval and investment 
decisions should follow the electricity plans.
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Then on November 7, 2016, NEA published the long-awaited 13th FYP on Electric 
Power Development (2016–2020) [20]. In addition to setting forth key principles on 
shifting China’s generation sources toward clean technologies, increasing system 
efficiencies and flexibility, optimizing location of generating resources, and further 
development of the power market, the Plan also set numeric targets for overall demand 
growth of 3.6%–4.8% per year, and targets for total generation capacity of various 
generation technologies by 2020 as follows: hydro, 340 GW; wind, 210 GW; solar, 
110 GW; nuclear, 58 GW; coal, 1,100 GW; and gas, 110 GW.
Given the ongoing economic transition and slowdown in demand growth, the range of 
total power demand growth remains on the high side. In particular, the target of 1,100 
GW of coal generation implies that 200 GW of added coal capacity is envisaged in a 
time when many coal plants are significantly underutilized. It shows that China’s energy 
planning has yet to develop a transparent and rigorous process to assess the capacity 
adequacy and the economic trade-offs between different generating resources, as well 
as demand-side resources. Further it is also unclear how environmental and climate 
goals are incorporated into the current planning process, especially at the provincial 
level. Although the Plan recommends enhancing electricity import and export within and 
between regional grids, it does not specify how to develop systematic electricity 
planning at the regional grid level and how to balance electricity demand and supply 
within and between regional grids.
3. Methods
There are three different ways to evaluate “overcapacity” for electricity generation:
 Reliability — How does the current level of generation capacity compare to what 
is needed to meet demand under most conditions?
 Economic — How does the current capacity level of individual resources (e.g., 
baseload, peaking) compare to what would be most economic? 
 Environmental — How does the current level of coal-, oil-, and natural gas-fired 
power generation compare to what is required to meet air quality and 
greenhouse gas emission reduction goals?
Reliability is, in many ways, the least stringent of these criteria. However, it is 
reasonably straightforward and offers important insights for planners and decision-
makers. Planning reserve margin is a commonly-used method to evaluate power 
system reliability. In this paper, we use planning reserve margin to assess overcapacity 
of coal power plants in China.
3.1. Planning Reserve Margins
The planning reserve margin (PRM) is defined as the percentage of available 
generating capacity (G) during an annual peak demand period in excess of peak 
demand (P):
PRM=G−P
P
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Planning reserve margins should, in principle, be set using a loss-of-load probability 
(LOLP) model, which matches a desired loss-of-load expectation (LOLE) to a planning 
reserve margin level. However, in some instances, including those in the U.S., planning 
reserve margin targets are used in lieu of more detailed LOLP analysis.
In China, there are no formal analytical methods used to evaluate and prescribe 
planning reserve margins. 
3.2. Regional Grids 
The focus of this paper’s analysis is China’s six regional electric grids (Figure 1). These 
grid regions were established in the early 2000s, with the dismantling of China’s national
State Power Corporation. Although accompanying power sector reforms were originally 
intended to culminate in regional power pools established around these regional grids, 
reforms ultimately stalled and were not restarted again until 2015. The regional grids 
have never been balancing areas, strictly defined, and balancing is still ultimately done 
at a provincial level [28]. However, in the future, regional grids may be considered as 
balancing areas, as China aims to integrate more variable renewable generation 
resources into its electricity grids.
Central Eastern
Northern
   Northeastern
Northwestern
Southern
Figure 1. Regional Electric Grids in China1
1 Inner Mongolia is divided into west and east. The western part of the province operates an independent grid, 
although it is often included in the Northern grid; the eastern part of the province is part of the Northeastern grid.
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Peak demand data for China is officially reported at a regional grid level, making this a 
convenient level of analysis. Using regional grids as the focus of a reserve margin 
analysis, however, requires assumptions that interprovincial transmission constraints 
and institutional limitations on generation capacity sharing across provinces do not 
exist, which is an aggressive assumption. For instance, an institutional limitation might 
be the lack of cost allocation mechanisms to ensure that an importing province pays a 
reasonable wholesale price to the generator in the exporting province. Interprovincial 
transmission and resource sharing constraints would tend to overstate regional reserve 
margin estimates. For instance, a regional reserve margin of 15% might correspond to 
provincial reserve margins of zero if provinces are completely isolated.2 
There is, however, a significant amount of interprovincial transmission capacity in China,
and these links could be expanded over the time horizons (five to ten years) analyzed in
this paper. The question of institutional constraints to generation capacity sharing is, to a
large extent, a question of political economy and political will. Thus, we use a regional 
reserve margin analysis to provide indicative results and useful insights.
3.3. Peak Electricity Demand Forecast
We forecast peak electricity demand (in gigawatts) in 2020 and 2025 using a forecast of
electricity (in gigawatt-hours, GWh) consumption and system load factors for China’s 
regional grids. System load factors (SLFs) are defined as the relationship between 
system average load (SAL) and system peak load (SPL):
SLF=SAL
SPL
where average load is the annual electricity consumption divided by 8,760 hours per 
year. Load factors are a convenient way to convert between electricity consumption and
peak demand. Residential and commercial customers tend to have lower load factors; 
whereas, industrial customers tend to have higher load factors.
Table 1 shows that load factors in 2014 varied significantly among grid regions in China, 
ranging from 69% in the less industrial Eastern grid to 93% in the more industrial 
Northwestern grid.3 
Electricity consumption in China is currently difficult to forecast, given the recent 
structural changes in the Chinese economy. Since 2010, the tertiary sector has been the
primary driver of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, while the secondary sector 
GDP growth has fallen to its lowest level in the last two decades (Figure 2).
2 For instance, consider two power systems, A and B, which have non-coincident peak demands of 10 GW (A) and 
5 GW (B), and a coincident peak demand of 13 GW. A 15% reserve margin for the regional coincident peak would 
require 15 GW of qualified generating capacity. If A has 10 GW of generating capacity and B has 5 GW, they are able
to meet a 15% regional reserve margin, but their individual (i.e., non-coincident) reserve margins are zero.
3 Consumption data here, and for all 2014 installed capacity by fuel type (thermal, nuclear, hydro, wind, solar, and 
others) for each province, is from the 2015 China Electricity Statistical Yearbook [29].
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Table 1. Electricity Consumption, Peak Demand, and System Load Factors for
Regional Grids in China, 2014
Grid Region Electricity 
Consumption
(TWh)
Peak Demand 
(GW)4
System Load 
Factor
(%)
Central 1,063 151 81
Eastern 1,333 221 69
Northern 1,306 192 78
Northeastern 402 55 84
Northwestern 579 72 93
Southern 950 136 80
TWh = terawatt-hours
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Figure 2. Real Economic Growth Rates by Sector in China, 1995 to 20155
These changes in economic structure are visible in electricity consumption data. Year-
on-year growth in monthly total electricity consumption fell steadily after 2010, and fell to
nearly zero for most of 2015 before increasing slightly in 2016 (Figure 3). Changes in 
total electricity consumption were driven by the secondary sector, which experienced 
declining year-on-year electricity demand growth throughout much of 2015. Over the 
course of the year, secondary sector electricity consumption fell by 1.4% relative to 
2014, with consumption by heavy industry falling by 1.9%.7 Falling secondary sector 
GDP and electricity consumption have led to a decoupling of GDP growth and electricity
consumption growth.
4 Here we use the CEC’s “peak net generator load” (最最最最最最最) as a measure of peak within-region demand. These
are “generator-side” demands, in that they already include transmission losses.
5 Sectoral and total GDP data for year 1995 to year 2014 are from China Statistical Yearbook of 2015. Sectoral and 
total GDP data for 2015 are from Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2015 National 
Economic and Social Development. All sectors were deflated using a national GDP deflator from the World Bank. 
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Figure 3. Year-on-Year Growth in Secondary, Tertiary, Residential, and Total
Electricity Consumption, July 2010 to June 20166
Changes in economic structure create a number of challenges for forecasting electricity 
consumption in China. Forecasts using aggregate linear secondary and tertiary sector 
GDP as explanatory variables tend to overstate the individual effects of these sectors. 
Using non-linear explanatory variables likely provides more realistic long-term forecasts,
but creates nearer-term discontinuities. Greater sectoral disaggregation could likely 
address these issues, but requires a larger number of assumptions about real value 
added growth rates by sector. For this reason, simpler regression forecasting models 
tend to give unsatisfactory results.
For this analysis, we began with an income- and population-driven regression model of 
provincial electricity consumption, using real provincial GDP by aggregate sector, real 
household expenditure, and population as explanatory variables.7 We aggregated these 
provincial electricity consumption forecasts to a regional grid level,8 and we explored a 
number of different functional forms.9 However, given the difficulties described in the 
previous paragraph, we ultimately settled on a simpler, scenario-based approach. 
6 Data are from the CEC, http://cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/. 
7 All of these data are from the China Statistical Yearbook series, accessed through China Data Online. Data for 
electricity consumption by sector were extracted from the Energy Balance Sheet for each province in the China 
Energy Statistical Yearbooks. For some provinces, electricity consumption by sector data were missing for multiple 
years. To fill in the gaps, we interpolated data by assuming an equal growth rate during the period of the year 
before the first year of missing data and the year after the last year of missing data. For one-year gaps, the growth 
rate was the average annual growth rate of the years immediately before and after.
8 Inner Mongolia is a challenge in this respect because the western part of the province operates an independent 
grid, though it is often included in the Northern grid; the eastern part of the province is part of the Northeastern 
grid. We allocated generation capacity and demand between Western and Eastern Inner Mongolia using available 
historical data. 
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In this approach, we developed scenarios of with low, medium and high assumptions of 
national electricity consumption growth rates from 2015 to 2020 and 2020 to 2025, and 
translate these to forecasts of regional grid electricity consumption using projected 
regional grid shares of total consumption. These projected shares are based on our 
GDP-driven forecasts, described in the preceding paragraph. Interestingly, the shares 
do not change significantly from base year (2014) shares (Table 2).
Table 2. Grid Region Shares of Total Electricity Consumption, 2014 Actual and
2020 and 2025 Projected
Grid Region 2014
(%)
2020
(%)
2025
(%)
Central 19 20 20
Eastern 25 25 25
Northern 23 22 22
Northeastern   7   7   6
Northwester
n
  9   9   9
Southern 17 17 17
For the low scenario of national electricity consumption growth rates, we assume an 
annual average growth of 1.5% between 2015 and 2020, and 1.0% between 2020 and 
2025 (Table 3). For the medium scenario of national electricity consumption growth 
rates, we assume annual average growth rates of 3.6% between 2015 and 2020 (the 
lower bound of electricity consumption growth rate in the 13th FYP on Electric Power 
Development) which then slow to 2.0% between 2020–2025, respectively. For the high 
scenario we assume annual average growth rates of 4.8% between 2015 and 2020 (the
higher bound of electricity consumption growth rate in the 13th FYP on Electric Power 
Development) which then slow to 3.0%, respectively. We scale national electricity 
consumption to 2015 using the NEA’s reported actual growth rate.
Table 3. Low, Medium and High Scenario Assumed Annual Average Growth Rates
for National Total Electricity Consumption (%/yr)
Scenario 2014–
2015
2015–
2020
2020–
2025
Low 0.5 1.5 1.0
Mid 0.5 3.6 2.0
High 0.5 4.8 3.0
These assumptions lead to the 2020 and 2025 electricity consumption forecasts shown 
in Table 4.
9 More specifically, we looked at “bottom-up” specifications where we used linear and linear-log forecasts for 
individual sectors and then aggregated these into a regional grid total, and “top-down” specifications where we 
used linear and linear-log forecasts of total electricity consumption, with sectoral variables as explanatory 
variables.
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Table 4. 2014 Actual and 2020 and 2025 Forecasted Electricity Consumption by
Grid Region (TWh) 
Grid Region 2014 Low Mid High
2020 2025 202
0
202
5
2020 2025
Central 1091 1204 1285 133
4
149
6 1413 1664
Eastern 1381 1536 1634 170
1
190
2 1802 2115
Northern 1311 1369 1410 151
6
164
1 1606 1826
Northeastern   397   403   411   44
7
  47
8   473   532
Northwestern   520   565   592   62
6
  68
9   663   766
Southern   932 1021 1076
1131
125
3 1198 1393
National 5632 6098 6409 675
5
745
8 7156 8295
We use these consumption projections to forecast peak demand by grid region. To do 
so, we assume that system load factors fall by 5% (total) in each of the 2014–2020 and 
2020–2025 time frames. This leads to the regional system load factors shown in Table 
5.
Table 5. System Load Factors by Grid Region, Actual 2014 and Forecasted 2020
and 2025
Grid Region 2014
(%)
2020
(%)
2025
(%)
Central 81 77 73
Eastern 69 65 62
Northern 78 74 70
Northeastern 84 80 76
Northwester
n
93 88 84
Southern 80 76 72
The values in Table 4 and Table 5 can be used to calculate regional grid peak demands,
using the equation below:
RGP= RGC
RLF×8760
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where RGP is regional grid peak, RGC is regional grid consumption, and RLF is 
regional system load factor. This leads to the forecasted peak demands shown in 
Table 6. “National” peak demand in the table is the sum of regional (non-coincident) grid
peak demands.
Table 6. Peak Demand by Grid Region, Actual 2014 and Forecasted 2020 and 2025
(GW)
Grid Region 2014 Low Mid High
2020 2025 2020 2025 2020 2025
Central 155 180   202   199   235   211   261
Eastern 229 268   300   297   349   314   388
Northern 193 212   230   235   268   249   298
Northeastern   54   58     62     64     72     68     80
Northwestern   64   73     81     81     94     86   105
Southern 134 154   171   171   199    181   221
National 828 944 1045 1046 1216 1108 1353
3.4. Effective Generation Resources
Different generation resources contribute differently to generation adequacy. Thermal 
(natural gas, coal, nuclear) plants, for instance, will generally be able to contribute as 
much as their nameplate (rated) capacity during peak system conditions. Hydropower’s 
maximum output, and thus its contribution to generation adequacy, alternatively, will be 
affected by seasonal changes in precipitation, constraints imposed by water release 
schedules, and reservoir capacity, and will be less than 100% of its rated capacity. Solar
and wind generation’s contribution to generation adequacy are shaped by the 
coincidence of incremental solar and wind generation and peak demand. 
The “effective” capacity of hydro, wind, and solar power—their contribution to generation
adequacy—can be assessed quantitatively using probability-based techniques. We are 
unaware of any such analysis for China. As a substitute, we use typical values for 
effective capacity of hydro, wind, and solar power in North America, shown in Table 7 
[6]. For simplicity, we assume that these values are constant across grid regions, which 
is unlikely to be the case. However, in lieu of better data, we argue that this a 
reasonable assumption.
Table 7. Capacity Credit Given to Hydro, Wind, and Solar Generation Resources
Region Hydro
(%)
Wind
(%)
Solar
(%)
Central 55 10 30
Eastern 55 10 30
Northern 55 10 30
Northeastern 55 10 30
Northwester 55 10 30
12
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
40
n
Southern 55 10 30
Two other adjustments to installed capacity data are necessary to convert it to effective 
capacity. First, China has a significant amount of behind-the-meter thermal generation, 
and the extent to which this generation is able to contribute to resource adequacy is 
unclear. As a middle-of-the-road assumption, we assume that the share of behind-the-
meter generation remains at 2014 levels (8%), that it has a load factor of 90%, and that 
half of it would be available to meet peak demand.10 Second, installed capacity data in 
China is reported as gross, rather than net, of generator own-use; whereas, effective 
capacity should be net of own-use. To convert gross to net generation, we use the 
values in Table 8.
Table 8. Generator Own-use by Resource Type11
Resource Own-
use (%)
Hydro 1
Thermal 5
Nuclear 5
Wind 1
Solar 1
Others 5
Total effective capacity (EC) is the sum of the total gross installed capacity (IC) of each 
resource, multiplied by one minus its own-use (OU), multiplied by its capacity credit 
(CC):
G=∑
i
IC i× (1−OU i )×CCi
3.5. Generation Resource Forecast
Our generation resource forecast begins with 2014 generation resources by region, 
shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Actual Generation Resources by Grid Region in 2014 (GW)
Region Hydro Therma
l
Nuclea
r
Wind Solar Other
Central 130 144   0   3   1 0
Eastern   27 222 11   7   4 0
Northern      8 239   0 34   4 0
10 2014 values for behind-the-meter are based on CEC data, http://cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/. All other values
are assumed. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Kahrl (2016) [6].
11 Thermal values are based on CEC data, http://cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/. All other values are assumed.
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Northeastern     8   90   2 23   1 0
Northwester
n   28 102   0 23 15 0
Southern 104 127   7   8   1 0
National 304 923 20 97 25 0
We make two key adjustments to 2014 resources. First, we extend thermal resources to
2015, to account for the significant increase (67 GW) in online thermal generation 
between 2014 and 2015 (Table 10). We allocate these new thermal resources across 
grid regions using data from Myllyvirta and Shen [8].
Table 10. Generation Resources by Grid Region, with Thermal Additions (GW)
Region Hydro Therma
l
Nuclea
r
Wind Solar Other
Central 130 161   0   3   1 0
Eastern   27 233 11   7   4 0
Northern    8 252   0 34   4 0
Northeastern    8   91   2 23   1 0
Northwester
n   28 102   0 23 15 0
Southern 104 144   7   8   1 0
National 304 982 20 97 25 0
Second, we assume that current public policy goals for thermal, hydro, nuclear, solar, 
and wind generation capacity, specified in the 13 FYP for Electricity Development, are 
met in 2020. Given the physical limitations on further hydropower development and 
potential social limitations on nuclear development, we assume that only solar and wind 
continue to expand into 2025. These values are shown in Table 11.
Table 11. Assumed Installed Capacity of Hydro, Nuclear, Solar, and Wind
Generation in 2020 and 2025 (GW)
Region 2020 2025
Hydro   380   380
Thermal 1210 1210
Nuclear     58     58
Solar 210 240
Wind 110 150
We allocate these resources to different grid regions based on each region’s share of 
total capacity for that resource in 2014. This leads to the installed capacity forecasts for 
each regional grid in 2020 and 2025 shown in Table 12.
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Combining the capacity credits in Table 7, assumptions about behind-the-meter 
generation, own-use values from Table 8, the installed capacity values in Table 9 and 
Table 12, and net interregional exports12 gives the total effective capacity values shown 
in Table 13.
These values can then be directly compared against the peak demand values in Table 
6.
Table 12. Installed Capacity by Grid Region in 2020 and 2025 by Grid Region (GW)
2020
Region Hydro Therma
l
Nuclea
r
Wind Solar Other
Central 162   189   0     6     3 0
Eastern   34   291 31   14   16 0
Northern   10   313   0   74   20 0
Northeastern   10   118   6   49     2 0
Northwester
n   35   133   0   50   65 0
Southern 129   166 21   17     4 0
National 380 1210 58 210 110 0
2025
Region Hydro Therma
l
Nuclea
r
Wind Solar Other
Central 162   189   0     7     4 0
Eastern   34   291 31   16   22 0
Northern   10   313   0   85   27 0
Northeastern   10   118   6   56     3 0
Northwester
n   35   133   0   58   89 0
Southern 129   166 21   19     6 0
National 380 1210 58 240 150 0
Table 13. Total Estimated Effective Capacity Values by Grid Region in 2014, 2020,
and 2025 (GW)
Region 2014 2020 2025
Central   173   234   235
Eastern   255   348   350
12 Net interregional exports are kept constant as the base year (2014) value from 2014 to 2025, 
as we do not have a good sense of generation and transmission build over the coming decade. 
Net interregional exports at the base year are the difference between regional peak generation 
and peak consumption, reported by CEC. 
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Northern   237   317   320
Northeastern     90   124   125
Northwester
n   107   158   166
Southern   184   250   251
National 1054 1440 1455
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Current Reserve Margins in China 
Our analysis shows that at the end of 2014, the average reserve margin for China as a 
whole was roughly 28%, almost twice as high as a typical planning reserve margin in 
the U.S. [30] However, this national average masks huge variations in reserve margins 
across major regional power grid areas: the Northeastern region has the highest 
reserve margin of 64%, followed by the Northwestern region at 49%, and the Southern 
grid area at 35% (Figure 4). 
Central grid
15%
Eastern
grid
16%
Northern grid
24%
Northeastern
grid
64%
Western grid
49%
Southern grid
35%
Figure 4. Estimated Reserve Margin in 2014
Note: A darker color represents a higher reserve margin.
Power generation overcapacity has increased since 2014, as China added significant 
new generation capacity in 2015. Based on preliminary data, the national average 
reserve margin increased to 38% at the end of 2015. 
4.2. Future Reserve Margins in China 
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Under the low-growth scenario, the national average reserve margin would grow to 53%
by 2020, and would remain at 39% by 2025. Overcapacity in the Northern, 
Northeastern, Northwestern, and Southern regions would be even more pronounced 
than 2014 levels in the low-growth scenario, becoming a multi-decadal problem. For the
Central and Eastern regions, reserve margins would reach 30% by 2020 and remain 
16% to 17% by 2025 (Figure 5). 
Under the medium-growth scenario, China’s national reserve margin would reach 38% 
by 2020 and fall to 20% by 2025. The Northern, Northwestern, Northeastern, and 
Southern regions would continue to have a large amount of overcapacity by 2020, all 
above 30%. By 2025, the Northern and Southern regions would still have adequate 
reserve margins (20% and 26%, respectively), but Northwestern and Northeastern 
regions would continue to have a lot of overcapacity, with reserve margins over 70%. 
Central and Eastern regions would still have adequate resources by 2020, with reserve 
margins slightly above 15%; however, by 2025 would need imports or additional 
capacity by 2025, when reserve margins fall to zero (Figure 5).
Under the high-growth scenario, China’s national reserve margin would fall to 30% by 
2020 and continue fall to 8% by 2025 (Figure 5). The Northwestern and Northeastern 
would continue to have a large amount of overcapacity by 2025, with reserve margins 
over 50%. Southern and Northern regions would have sufficient capacity for their own 
use by 2020, but would need more capacity by 2025, with reserve margins below 15%. 
Only the Eastern and Central regions would need additional imports from other regions 
or new generation capacity by 2020, as their reserve margins would fall to about 11% by
2020.
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13%
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Figure 5. Planning Reserve Margins in 2020 under the Low (a), Mid (b), and High
(c) Growth Scenarios, and Planning Reserve Margin in 2025 under the Low (d),
Mid (e) and High (f) Growth Scenarios
Note: Red colors represent a severe excess of capacity, increasing in seriousness as the color 
becomes darker. Yellow colors represent a fair amount of reserve margin and may potentially be
receiving excess power from the red-colored regions. The darker the yellow color, the more 
potential the region has of receiving power.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this analysis, we examined current and future reserve margins in China’s regional 
grids under three scenarios of electricity demand growth. Figure 6 shows the reserve 
margins in 2020 under the three growth scenarios. In general, China has more than 
enough power plants to meet electricity demand today, and does not need any new 
thermal power plants for reliability purposes by 2020, and potentially by 2025. China 
may need certain clean generation technologies, such as wind and solar, to meet its 
climate goals under the Paris Agreement, and domestic air quality goals. It may also 
need more flexible technologies to cost-effectively integrate these low-emission 
resources into the grid. Such renewable and flexible power resources may displace 
some thermal baseload capacity in the next five to ten years. 
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Figure 6. Reserve Margins in 2020 under Three Growth Scenarios 
Results for regional reserve margins show a clear regional pattern: the Northwestern 
and Northeastern grid regions would likely have overcapacity regardless of demand 
scenarios in the next ten years; the Central and Eastern regions may need new 
resources as early as 2020; and the Northern and Southern grid regions may need new 
resources in 2025 only under a high-growth scenario. However, there are significant 
uncertainties in demand growth in the future. Therefore, government agencies need 
more robust and integrated planning tools to manage investment risks. 
The current large discrepancies in reserve margins among grid regions also suggest the
importance of coordination among grid regions in providing for generation adequacy 
across China. Resource sharing among provinces and regions, such as through 
regional power markets, could improve efficiency and push back the time before new 
investment is needed. The Eastern and Central regions’ potential shortfalls, for instance,
could be most cost-effectively supplied by using existing resources in the Southern 
region. The Northern region’s shortfalls could be supplied through imports from the 
Northwest and Northeast. Greater coordination in generation adequacy across grid 
regions would require mechanisms for cost allocation, such as bilateral contracts. An 
expansion of bilateral exchanges across grid regions has been part of the NDRC’s 
proposed power sector reform framework. However, the trading and dispatch systems 
to allow interregional exchange have yet to take shape. Creating them should be a 
priority. 
As China transitions from a coal-dominant to a low-carbon power system, the big 
question becomes: which non-coal generation resources (as well as demand-side 
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resources) will be needed in China by 2020 and 2025? Current levels of coal-fired 
generation may already be too high relative to least-cost and environmental planning 
goals. The current window of overcapacity provides a useful respite to examine this 
question with greater rigor, and highlights the importance of strengthening electricity 
planning processes and methods in China, and of refining China’s regulatory 
governance structure and operating practices.
More specifically, in considering near-term steps to address electricity resource needs in
China, we suggest that government agencies prioritize four key areas: 
 More stringent policies, regulations, and mechanisms to halt the construction of 
new coal-fired generating units, including changes to their incentives.13
 A more scientific and workable planning process for the electricity sector that: (a) 
better coordinates among different geographic and administrative levels 
(provincial, regional, central) and across different resources (generation, 
demand-side, transmission), (b) uses economic evaluation methods and a 
scenario-based approach to forecasting and risk management, and (c) has 
clearer links between planning and investment decisions. 
 Explicit consideration of the potential to use, and option the value of using, 
energy efficiency and demand response to meet longer-term generation capacity 
needs, lengthening the window of time in which the government can design and 
implement reforms before new generation resources are needed.
 The continued development of markets and regulatory institutions that facilitate 
economic dispatch, ideally across regions, which will in turn support longer-term 
resource adequacy by enabling greater sharing of generation resources across 
provinces. 
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